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On the Freedom to be Opaque Monsters: Communist pedagogy, aesthetics, and the sublime  
Abstract: 
 
As social movements amplify across the globe, activists and researchers are increasingly 
interested in the pedagogies of revolutionary transformation. To provide a rich resource for 
political educators and organizers, this paper formulates what we call an (un)communicative 
communist pedagogy that is oriented against communicative capitalism. We show that there is a 
taut connection between capitalism and democracy that consists of a shared logic, pedagogy, and 
aesthetic that revolves around communication, inclusion, and transparency. Without grasping 
this aesthetic connection, anti-capitalist struggles are reduced to liberal reforms that end up 
reinforcing and deepening capitalist production relations. To break out of this trap, we block 
together several political, philosophical, and aesthetic theories that might otherwise be thought of 
as mutually exclusive.  In particular, we return to Kant and his theory of the beautiful and the 
sublime to make a case that connections between capitalism and democracy rest on an 
unexamined aesthetic of the beautiful.  To sever this link, and thus to push democratic struggles 
for equality toward a communist horizon, we suggest a new alignment between radical politics 
and aesthetics of the sublime via the Communist Party.  Importantly, we find in the work of 
Lyotard the point of intersection between communist pedagogy and sublime aesthetics. In 
closing, we read this aesthetic communist pedagogy through a communist study group in the Jim 
Crow South.  What we find is a different aesthetic relationship between self and world that is not 
prefigured in various forms of liberal reformism. Rather, an excessive surplus is discovered that 
presses beyond the boundaries of what can be known and what can be imaginatively figured, 
provoking a sense of ineffable sublimity or political opacity.  We call this excess the aesthetic 
dimension of (un)communicative communism. 
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Struggles against capitalism today are often, but of course not exclusively, posed as 
struggles for democracy, especially in its various liberal guises. This is even true in critical and 
radical academic research (e.g., Hardt & Negri 2005; Chou 2014; Steigler & Turner 2010). On 
one level this has appeal, for there seems to be an enduring contradiction between capitalism and 
democracy. For whereas democracy is the rule of the many, which demands the maximum 
political participation of the populous, capitalism is the rule of the few, which demands the 
minimum political participation of the proletarians. Whereas democracy demands equality (one 
person, one vote), capitalism demands inequality (one dollar, one vote). Education has been 
integral in managing this contradiction. For example, in the US one of the founding rationales for 
the public school system was that it would suspend this contradiction through the introduction of 
meritocracy and equal opportunity, and the creation of a citizenry that is viewed in terms of 
nation and not class. David Labaree thus writes that the formation of “the public school system 
was part of a grand compromise between democratic politics and capitalist markets that has 
proven essential for the durability of the United States as a liberal democracy” (2010: 4). 
Education is the hinge that allows capitalism and democracy to cohabitate. Much of radical and 
critical educational thought has seen education as a lever that can push us away from capitalism 
and towards democracy, moving us to one side of the antagonism (e.g., De Lissovoy 2015; 
Giroux 2015). Through changes in curriculum and content, pedagogy, and teacher-student 
relationships, so the thinking goes, we can create a new (or, in liberal cases, old) set of social 
relations. 
 Within this literature addressing the relationship between education and capitalism, 
relatively little attention has been paid to aesthetics.1 At the same time, in explorations of the 
aesthetic realm and its possible anti-capitalist tendencies, there has been little attention paid to 
questions of pedagogy. There is a crucially neglected moment here for a more robust articulation 
of the relationship between anti-capitalist pedagogy and aesthetics that could not only enrich 
both sides of this dialectic, but could also provide key insights for political educators and 
organizers. However, to intervene on this terrain alone, we believe, would be a mistake, for there 
is an error that runs the gamut of this educational and aesthetic conversation that has yet to be 
corrected, and that is the supposition that there is an inherent antagonism between democracy 
and capitalism, and that in order to be opposed to one, we must be for the other. There is, so we 
argue in this article, a taut connection between capitalism and democracy that consists of a 
shared logic, pedagogy, and aesthetic that revolves around communication, inclusion, and 
transparency. Without grasping this aesthetic connection, anti-capitalist struggles are reduced to 
liberal reforms that end up reinforcing and deepening capitalist production relations. To break 
out of this trap, we propose and articulate a communist aesthetic pedagogy. 
 To make this happen, we block together several political, philosophical, and aesthetic 
theories that might otherwise be thought of as mutually exclusive.  In particular, we will return to 
Kant and his theory of the beautiful and the sublime in order to make a case that connections 
between capitalism and liberal democracy rest on an unexamined aesthetic of the beautiful.  To 
break this connection, and thus to push democratic struggles for equality toward a communist 
horizon, we suggest a new alignment between radical politics and aesthetics of the sublime via 
the Communist Party.  Importantly, we find in the work of Lyotard the point of intersection 
between communist pedagogy and sublime aesthetics. In closing, we read this aesthetic 
communist pedagogy through a communist study group in the Jim Crow South.  What we find 
there is a different aesthetic relationship between self and world that is not prefigured in various 
forms of liberal reformism.  Indeed, an excessive surplus is discovered that presses beyond the 
boundaries of what can be known and what can be imaginatively figured, thus provoking a sense 
of ineffable sublimity or political opacity.  We call this excess the aesthetic dimension of 
(un)communicative communism.     
 
The Endless Loop of Communicative Capitalism 
 
Communicative capitalism names the confluence of capitalism and democracy via 
networked technologies and the recent radical transformation in information and communication 
networks. The democratic ideals of access, participation, inclusion, diversity, transparency, and 
critique become actualized through capitalist technological infrastructure. New forms of 
communication technology increase the possibility of democratic participation and discussion by 
bringing more people into conversation with each other. Anyone with access to a computer or 
smart phone can start a blog, vlog, Tumblr, Facebook, or Twitter account, gain followers, state 
their opinions on any debate. We can comment endlessly on others’ posts, news stories, pictures, 
videos, and more. We can post about or file complaints with private entities or government 
offices across the globe in an instant. If someone posts something racist or sexist, we can 
screenshot it, and tweet it at their bosses. Not enough access to information or avenues to voice 
your participation? There’s an app for that! 
 Jodi Dean (2009), who first theorized communicative capitalism, notes that rather than 
“leading to more equitable distributions of wealth and influence, instead of enabling the 
emergence of a richer variety in modes of living and practices of freedom,” networked 
communications “coincides with extreme corporatization, financialization, and privatization 
across the globe” (23). Increased participation in communicative capitalism enriches the coffers 
of the global elite at the expense of the global poor. There is not only the massive 
conglomeration of technologies and gadgets, like data servers, databases, computers, smart 
phones, cables, and satellites (and the energy that goes into powering them and keeping them 
cool), but there is also the expropriation of information, data, and social relations generated 
through the use of such technologies. Just as importantly, it has done the important ideological 
work of erasing the antagonism that is fundamental to political organization. The circulation of 
ideas, memes, blog posts, and so on contributes “to the billions of nuggets of information and 
affect trying to catch and hold attention, to push or sway opinion, taste, and trends in one 
direction rather than another” (24). 
 In this sense, to demand democracy is to demand more capitalism, and vice versa. Indeed, 
democracy as liberal democracy is barely distinguishable from the economic logic of production 
and exchange which underlies it.  What is more, even anti-capitalist and anti-democratic 
critiques and resistance are flattened and dulled in this configuration. It’s a trap. Dean’s critique 
of the Left emerges as an insistence that we begin our resistance from within this trap. We can’t 
sidestep the reflexive circuits of communicative capitalism; we have to burst out of them. This is 
a political project in part about subjectivity and, so we wish to suggest, about aesthetics. 
Communicative capitalism produces us as individual subjects who find our being only in our 
unique subjectivity. Educationally speaking, we become individualized learners, each worried 
about our own skill sets and how we can market ourselves as unique human capital to 
corporations. The Left has bought into it all.2 “When the Left echoes injunctions to 
individuality,” she writes, “when we emphasize unique perspectives and personal experiences, 
we function as vehicles for communicative capitalist ideology” (Dean 2016: 35). Dean, of 
course, doesn’t call for some flattening of differences or the dismissal of lived experience in 
response. Instead, her response has led her to an exploration of the Communist Party as an 
affective infrastructure that is heterogeneous, permeable, flexible, and variegated. While her 
theory of the Party is rich and has many compelling characteristics, what we wish to expand on 
here is a minor component of Dean’s theory that we see as deeply important, which we refer to 
as the Party’s opacity. 
 The problem posed by communicative capitalism and its process of individualization is 
that it covers over division—divisions that resist articulation within debates, and thus resist the 
transparency and communicability so privileged by democratic liberalism. Rather than 
fundamental antagonisms, politics becomes about individual differences of opinion and feelings 
struggling to assume visibility within a political community. The demand for inclusion and 
participation excludes division from the purview of the political, and from subjectivity: 
 
The split in the people goes all the way down. It can’t be limited to the idea that some are 
excluded from the people (and hence that including them would solve the problem of the 
gap). Nor can it be rendered as the problem of representation (and hence addressed via 
ontology). Rather, the people do not know what they want. They are not fully present to 
themselves. Conflicting and contradictory desires and drives render the people a split 
subject perpetually pushing to express, encounter, and address its own non-knowledge. 
(90-91) 
 
While communicative capitalism individuates us as subjects (and indeed sustains itself through 
the production of autonomous subjects), the Party de-individualizes us and organizes us as a 
collective subject that produces another split: a gap between the word as it exists and something 
else; “instead of asserting unity, communists assert the gap” (255). More precisely, the Party 
seizes this gap, intensifies it, and holds it open. This produces an affective disjointedness in 
which we can feel ourselves otherwise, where we can experience our potentiality divorced from 
the demands for communication, recognition, and integration within a liberal system (Ford, 
2017).  
 Dean’s Party is an opaque organization, yet it lacks any aesthetic formulation. This is a 
problem because communicative capitalism is itself a deeply aesthetic project, one that, as we 
argue below, is founded on Kant’s aesthetic community. As such, opting for the Party will 
necessitate an aesthetic alteration, what we will refer to as a shift from the beauty of 
communicative capitalism to the sublimity of (un)communicative communism.  There is 
something supersensible about the Party that denies full, transparent communication as dictated 
by liberal democracy and communicative capitalism.  More to the point of pedagogy, however, 
by articulating a sublime aesthetic dimension to the Party, we can develop a crucial resource for 
educators and organizers in our struggle for a different world along radically different aesthetic 
lines.  
 
The Question of the Beautiful and the Sublime 
 
The sublime has become an increasingly important contemporary aesthetic category.  
While the concept of the sublime can be traced all the way back to ancient Greek philosophy and 
the work of Longinus, in the modern era, Kant’s discussion of the sublime has become as 
fundamental as it is controversial.  But before we can appreciate Kant’s analysis of the sublime 
and how it is related to the political (and pedagogical), we first have to take a short detour 
through his understanding of the beautiful.  
 According to Kant (2000) there are essentially three kinds of aesthetic judgments.  While 
differing amongst themselves, they are all nevertheless aesthetic because they rest on subjective 
grounds.  Judgments of the agreeable, the beautiful (taste), and the sublime thus find their 
justifications in feelings rather than on objective properties of things or rational concepts. 
Pleasure in the agreeable is based on desire/need and is therefore particular to individual cases 
(5:206).   Because it is personal, agreeableness cannot be universalized, and in this sense, 
agreeableness is in the eye of the beholder. Here Kant makes another distinction between the 
beautiful and the good (5:208).  Pleasure in the good, like the agreeable, is based on desire.  We 
desire the good because it will somehow improve our lives or make us excellent.  Agreeableness 
and the good are concerned with pleasure and with some kind of interest in the object.  Yet there 
is a key difference.  Unlike the merely agreeable, the pleasure from the good comes from the 
application of a concept of what something is intended to be.  
Now we can turn to Kant’s reflections on the beautiful (5:210).  Like the agreeable and 
the good, the beautiful is subjective.  For Kant, the beautiful is the sensation of a harmonious 
resonance between the imagination and the understanding and is therefore not found in the 
objective properties of things.  Yet unlike the agreeable and the good, the pleasure from the 
beautiful is not a satisfaction based on desire or on respect for a law or standard.  Two 
implications follow.  First, judgments of taste are free.  They are free in the sense that they do not 
need to obey the body (and its desires or needs) or the law (and its conceptual standards of 
practice or acceptability).  Second, judgments of taste are disinterested in that we do not need to 
have our desires fulfilled or achieve congruency with a set standard in order to feel a beautiful 
pleasure.   
Because judgments of the beautiful are free and disinterested, we are committed to the 
claim that everyone should also judge the object as beautiful (5:213-5:214).  Aesthetic judgments 
are universal (no exceptions) and necessary (it must be the case).  It is important to note that 
Kant has put his finger on a very real phenomenon here.  There are indeed times in our lives 
when we are prepared to defend our judgments of taste from attack and to assert that we regard 
others as wrong when they do not agree with us.  Unlike the agreeable, where we simply throw-
up our hands and say “well you like what you like and I like what I like” and go separate ways, 
in judgments of the beautiful, an argument ensues wherein each party attempts to convince the 
other of the rightness of a certain judgment of taste. Indeed, we are sure many of us have had the 
experience of being shocked when someone does not agree with our taste.  This indicates that we 
have presumed that there is something universal in our judgment, something that is not reducible 
to the agreeable.  There is a sense of purposiveness in the object yet, unlike the good, we cannot 
put our finger on what that something is or what specific purpose an object teleologically fulfills.  
The judgment must remain subjective (thus lacking a concept of reason to guide it) even in its 
claims to universality.  Judgments of this kind are paradoxically, subjectively universal.   
 For the purposes of this essay, there is one other small point about Kant’s analysis of the 
beautiful.  When we state “X is beautiful” we are assuming everyone can and should agree with 
the statement.  We believe others ought to agree with our judgment of taste because our pleasure 
is free (and thus not bound to personal desires or needs and is not beholden to any law or 
standard which can be measured).  But in practice this is rarely the case and we find ourselves in 
constant dispute over who does and does not have taste. Kant describes this situation as follows:  
someone makes an aesthetic judgment and makes it public, “then he expects the very same 
satisfaction of others” he judges not merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of beauty 
as if it were a property of things…he rebukes them if they judge otherwise, and denies that they 
have taste, though he nevertheless requires that they ought to have it” (5:213).  Because 
judgments of taste are never guaranteed in relation to a concept (for that would be a judgment of 
the good), there is no way to absolutely verify that anyone’s judgment is truly disinterested (and 
thus free).  The result is as follows for Kant:  
Whereas the taste of reflection, which, as experience teaches, is often enough rejected in 
its claim to the universal validity of its judgment (about the beautiful), can nevertheless 
find it possible (as it also actually does) to represent judgments that could demand such 
assent universally, and does in fact expect it of everyone for each of its judgments, while 
those who make those judgments do not find themselves in conflict over the possibility of 
such a claim, but only find it impossible to agree on the correct application of this faculty 
in particular cases. (5:214)   
This is a community that is open and pluralistic because no one can prove or disprove that such 
and such is a real judgment of taste.   A beautiful community is, on our reading, a liberal, 
inclusive, democratic community open to everyone—an everyone that is always communicating 
judgments and thus always in dispute.  
 We will come back to the political implications of the Kant’s theory of an aesthetic 
community in perpetual dispute, but now we are finally set to turn to our central topic: the 
sublime.  Kant divides the sublime into two basic varieties. The mathematical sublime is defined 
as something “absolutely large” that is, “large beyond all comparison” (5:249). Usually when 
speaking of the size of things, we make either an implicit or explicit comparison.  For instance, 
when we say things like “that person is tall!” we usually mean that they are tall compared to 
other people. Yet, when referring to the absolutely large, we do not make any comparison, 
meaning that the thing is large in and for itself (“the universe is vast”).  The dynamically sublime 
refers to a magnitude of power (rather than size).  Here we can think of vast storms raging, or of 
the power of the atomic bomb. In both cases, the subject feels terror at being overwhelmed by 
something so vast that it cannot be properly measured or calculated.  And, different from a 
judgment of the beautiful, the sublime has (at least on the first pass) no sense of purposiveness. 
Indeed, there is a profound feeling of contra-purposiveness that forces us to ask the question, 
“why did that hurricane have to happen?” Or, when staring up at the universe, “it all seems so 
meaningless and empty….”  In both cases, there is a sense of pain attached to the sublime.  We 
are finite, and there are forms and forces out there that we cannot hope to represent through our 
fallible, precarious senses.   
 Yet this is not the end of the story for Kant.  While the sublime first gives the impression 
of contra-purposiveness in which we feel our sense of finality through our failure to grasp 
something as a whole (and thus make sense of it), there immediately emerges a second feeling.  
The failure of the senses to represent the immensity of the sublime leads us to contemplate the 
nature of reason itself, and its ability to think the world beyond the senses and the imagination.  
Thus, the sublime gives way to the supersensible realm of reason and critical self-reflection on 
the mind’s free autonomy from brute, material existence.  Whereas the aesthetic community 
argues endlessly about what is and is not beautiful, the sublime community—faced with that 
which is unfathomable, supersensible, and opaque— pauses to reflect on its own conditions of 
possibility.  It therefore returns us to the potentiality of reason to touch upon an excess which 
cannot be figured through imaginative resources or linguistic discourse.   
 
The Politics of the Beautiful and the Sublime 
 In this section, we would like to make a political leap from Kantian reflections on the 
beautiful and the sublime to more contemporary political issues and ideas.  This move is not as 
farfetched as it might at first appear.  Indeed, scholars ranging from Friedrich Schiller (1982), to 
Hannah Arendt (1982), to Joesph Chytry (1989) have linked Kant’s description of aesthetic 
judgments with some form of participatory democracy. For instance, Arendt argues that the 
judgment of the beautiful can be a paradigm for a non-possessive, non-consuming political 
society and a shared world characterized by unrestrained communication.  While there are many 
merits to this line of inquiry, in the rest of this article we would like to take pause and offer a 
possible criticism of the links between the beautiful and the particular form of democratic 
politics unique to communicative capitalism.  
 As outlined above, the aesthetic community argues about what is and is not beautiful.  
Because all positions are subjective yet claim universality (without clear guarantee), all must be 
included, and the debate appears endless.  There is a constant circulation of criticism, verbiage, 
opinions, and commentary.  In this sense, the beautiful forms the aesthetic background of 
communicative capitalism’s liberalized democracy. Stated differently, the democracy of 
communicative capitalism is modeled on Kant’s aesthetic community.  It might at first appear 
that communicative capitalism is predicated on judgments of the agreeable and/or the good.  For 
instance, it might appear that all choices within communicative capitalism are simply personal 
preferences, thus prioritizing the individual self as the autonomic unit of political and economic 
organization.  Stated differently, the agreeable applies to individual cases of consumption, which 
cannot be universalized, and drive economic production through the proliferation of desires.  On 
another level, it might appear that communicative capitalism equates its judgments with that of 
the good.  This good is derived strictly from financial logistics: the market decides what is best 
and what is right; profit is the ultimate bottom line.  Thus we are told that “the economy is 
improving” even though working conditions worsen and the income gap increases.  Although 
both of these observations are right in a certain sense, the real heart of communicative capitalism 
is the subjective universalism of the beautiful.  Thus, the fundamental claim is that “capitalism is 
the best possible economic system.”  This is the most basic form of subjective universalism in 
that it does not rest on any objective criteria or economic law (indeed material conditions would 
suggest precisely the opposite) and yet it is taken to be a universal truth to which all rational 
individuals should agree.  Presupposed here is a fundamental consensus that is not predicated on 
any concept besides the feeling of seemingly spontaneous accord between human self-interest 
and economic advantage.  Because of this spontaneous feeling, capitalism—as a system—cannot 
be reduced to any class-specific set of interests.  Indeed, it takes on a radically disinterested (and 
thus economically objective) appearance.   Capitalism is a taste for a certain kind of disinterested 
community where everyone and everything can be put into circulation (and thus argued about 
and debated).  In all cases, communicative capitalism circulates judgments of the agreeable and 
the good, thus excluding a sublime excess which cannot be communicated. 
While such a community constitutes itself through channels of communication, it is also 
predicated on an excess which it does not communicate, which remains supersensible: economic 
inequity and the class struggle which it engenders.  The political question becomes, how to 
conceptualize this excess beyond the beautiful?  Such a question is also pedagogical: can one 
teach an excess that denies communication, that defies figuration/formalization?  Instead of 
communicative inclusion as the bedrock of educational responses to capitalism, can we think of 
an education that, as Édouard Glissant (1997) might state, asserts the right to opacity?  Such 
pedagogy would demand a different kind of taste: a taste for that which is painful, formless, but 
also radically open to that which expands beyond the horizon of communicative capitalism. 
 
Teaching the Sublime Excess of Communicative Capitalism 
 
Before drawing out a sublime pedagogy from Lyotard, we want to first locate such a 
pedagogy from within his critique of liberal democracy. We do this not only to provide crucial 
context for such a pedagogy, but also because Lytoard helps us gain a deeper appreciation of the 
interdependent aesthetic commitments that bind capitalism and democracy to the beautiful. In 
this sense, Lyotard helps enrich Dean’s critique of communicative capitalism—in particular a 
critique of its aesthetic logic—and also helps articulate a pedagogical practice of what we will 
ultimately call (un)communicative communism.   
 Across his body of work, Lyotard makes frequent mention of “the system.” While many 
have interpreted him as an apolitical pragmatist with no interest in any particular system, Lyotard 
indeed writes of the system. Specifically, in a collection of fables published in the early 1990s, 
Lyotard (1997) defines the system in at least two ways: “liberal, imperialist capitalism” (199) 
and “liberal democratic” (89). If Dean provides us with a way to understand the contemporary 
intermingling of capitalism and liberalized democracy that emerges from the development of 
communication networks, Lyotard gives us a critique of democracy that demonstrates how this 
intermingling evolves out of the very ethos of democracy. In essence, the theory is that 
democracy is the political mode that allows for the greatest complexification, contradiction, 
difference, crisis, instability, and decenterdness. In a democracy, everything is open for debate, 
including the rules of debate. Contradictions and crises don’t stifle democracy, but propel it 
forward. “This process was called progress,” he tells us (90). 
 His critique of democracy is not that it is adaptable or that it accommodates (lots of) 
opposition, but rather that it demands endless publicity and expression. Liberal democracy, in 
other words, can’t tolerate the excess of the sublime, and so it forces us again and again to 
participate in deliberation, dialogue, and communication. As Margret Grebowicz (2011) states: 
“The democratic state denies the subject her secret existence… by pressuring her to exert her 
rights at all times, to be exhaustively, absolutely public. One must be crazy not to exercise the 
rights one has! ‘Why didn’t you do this, do that? You had the right!’” (151). 
Current liberal democracy, on this reading, can tolerate dissent, but it can’t tolerate 
dissent that isn’t made public, that isn’t expressed, that is held in abeyance.  Here we can 
appreciate the deep kinship between this political logic and capitalism, for both compel us to 
actualize everything, to enter absolutely everything we can into the circuits of communication 
and exchange. Perhaps we could summarize this in the form of a simple mandate: “be what you 
produce!”  Produce can be read in terms of economic imperatives to translate one’s labor power 
into surplus value, in terms of a political imperative to speak your mind, and in terms of an 
aesthetic imperative to communicate one’s judgment of taste.  In fact, Lyotard (1997) writes that 
the system “is but the extension to language of the same routine of exchange: interlocution, 
interactiveness, transparency, and debate, words are exchanged for words as use value is 
exchanged for use value” (209).  
Glissant makes a similar point.  He argues that within current forms of Western 
democracy, difference is heralded as an inherent political good, yet such differences—when they 
enter into communicative circuits—reinforce the normative value of transparency and 
accessibility. Thus, the call for interlocution, interactivity, and so forth are ways of enclosing 
difference within a form: the form of a beautiful community where everyone can speak, be 
heard, and find a place within a discourse.  Such enclosing is also, for Glissant, a form of 
appropriation that, indeed, denies that there is really any true difference, any true otherness that 
can elude Lyotard’s system.  In opposition to this position, Glissant and Lyotard propose the 
affirmation of an irreducible opacity, and thus a solidarity that emerges from within a space that 
is not supported by communicative recognition. 
 What ultimately resists democracy and communicative capitalism is that which the Party 
organizes: our collective opacity. Here, Lyotard’s aesthetic ruminations and pedagogical 
provocations provide important resources for communist theorizing. Lyotard turns to the 
aesthetic because it is here where the silent secret takes up residence against the demands of the 
system. To respect this, however, we have to approach aesthetics carefully, for works of art are 
“born elsewhere, far from all communicational transparency.” Having been born as such, they 
bear a “resistance and opacity [that] must be respected… even when one is trying to make 
commentary on them” (207). It is important to note that this holds not for any particular medium, 
and in fact, for Lytoard, philosophy itself represents a sublime resistance to liberal democracy 
and capitalism. 
 In a series of lectures that Lyotard delivered to first-year students at Sorbonne University 
in the fall of 1964, Lyotard (2013) asks: why philosophize? By asking why philosophize, and not 
what is philosophy, Lyotard foregrounds the disruption inherent in philosophy, which is an act 
and not a discipline or thing. Whereas to ask what philosophy is would be to pin it down, 
proceeding on the assumption that philosophy is a particular thing, to ask why philosophize 
“bears within itself the annihilation of what it is questioning” (18). In this sense, philosophy, like 
the sublime itself, is not bound by a question of form.  If it were, it would become something 
beautiful.  Rather, philosophy is immeasurable (always appearing where and when it is not 
wanted) and dynamic (always exceeding any attempt to bridle its powers of critical reflection 
and creative speculation).  For everything philosophy demonstrates or reveals, it hides 
something, renders something else obscure or oblique. We philosophize because we desire, 
because our lives are ruled by “the yes and no:” “even when we are at the heart of things, of 
ourselves, of others, of time or of speech, their reverse side is constantly present to us” (26). 
Desire names the hinge that constantly swings back and forth between unity and separation.  It 
exists in a supersensible gap.  In short, philosophy is not about communication.  On this reading, 
philosophy—though spoken—interrupts communicative circuits precisely by annihilating itself 
in its very articulation.   
Lyotard (1993) specifically addresses the teaching of philosophy in a letter to Hugo 
Vermeren, which was published as part of a collection initially titled, The Postmodern Explained 
to Children. While this title may convey derision and contempt for the “postmodern debate,” it is 
actually quite sincere and serious. Childhood is an important theme that recurs throughout 
Lyotard’s opus. Childhood names the state in which the human is also inhuman, is not yet 
integrated into the established community of speakers and knowers. The child is not completely 
reducible to the system, and therefore not beholden to the rule of communicative dominance.  
Whereas the adult knows, has mastered language and the world, the child has no such pretenses. 
The child knows things for which it does not have words, knows that there is more to know, is 
never quite satisfied with the answers received, and won’t hesitate to interrupt anything with 
relentless questioning. There is no concern in childhood for efficiency, rationality, or 
performativity. The child doesn’t really want to know: it wants to want to know, or, it desires 
desire. It should be clear, then, that childhood is not at all a stage in a linear development of the 
human, just as the postmodern is not something that comes after the modern, a fact that is often 
lost on critics. 
Childhood is like philosophy, or at least how philosophy should be. Rather than being 
grounded in rationality and striving towards systematizing the world, philosophy is an act of 
asking, listening, of interrupting and letting oneself be interrupted. In this sense, philosophy is 
fundamentally an aesthetic instead of epistemological experience—one which is summarized in 
the experience of the child.  “Childhood,” he writes to Hugo, “is the monster of philosophers. It 
is also their accomplice. Childhood tells them that the mind is not given. But that it is possible” 
(100). Childhood is monstrous in its embrace of excess and its rejection of the quest for concrete 
knowledge. That it is a monster and an accomplice to the philosopher means that it is not a state 
within a successive path of development, being neither the progenitor nor offspring of the 
philosopher; “It is what, in the midst of man, throws him off course… it is the possibility or risk 
of being adrift. We always begin in the middle” (101). That one must begin in the middle means 
that there are no prerequisites or foundational understandings necessary for the course of 
philosophy. There is no teleology leading from child to adult.  There is always a monstrous, 
opaque, and thus immeasurable gap that opens within such systems, and this is where we find 
philosophy.   
Consider the act of reading, through which we learn that “reading is never finished, that 
you can only commence, and that you have not read what you have read. Reading is an exercise 
in listening” (ibid.). Philosophical reading presupposes that there is always something else there, 
something that will resist articulation, communication, and transparent recognition. In this way, 
philosophy as an act of listening doesn’t entail achieving understanding at all; it rather entails 
forgetting, but a particular type of forgetting, which Lyotard, drawing on psychoanalysis, calls 
anamnesis. In the clinic, anamnesis is a practice wherein the analysand engages in free-play 
association, and from this, the analyst picks up on recurring signifiers and themes. This is usually 
done when helping the analysand work through a repressed event. Through anamnesis the patient 
is taken hold of by the unknown, thereby allowing themselves to be guided by the unpresentable. 
 Lyotard’s pedagogy, at its base, entails teaching one to be open to alterity, to be seized 
and held by the monstrous childhood of thought. The characteristics that Lyotard ascribes to such 
an educational process include “patience, anamnesis, and recommencement” (105) and 
“anamnesis, discomposure, and elaboration” (107). We see, then, a contradictory movement of 
discovery, articulation, and loss, with all phases of the educational process happening 
simultaneously.   
 
(Un)Communicative Communist Aesthetic Pedagogy 
  
If there is an aesthetic unconscious for Lyotard’s pedagogy, it is a sublime unconscious.  
In the face of the monstrousness of the sublime, he posits a form of philosophical education that 
speaks the ineffable within the effable, the uncommunicative within the communicative without 
thereby reducing this excess to yet another consumable signifier.  Whereas the beautiful acts of 
communicative democracy always call for recognition through inclusive dialogue and debate, the 
sublime acts of philosophical education call for misrecognition, interruption, and forgetting. One 
focuses on the circulation of opinions while the other turns inward to look at the very aporias of 
thinking itself, to the silences and gaps.  Because this aesthetic turn might be overwhelming if 
not painful (as Kant might argue), Lyotard emphasizes the need for a pedagogical form of 
patience with what is hidden, what withdraws, what remains unsaid in the said.  Thus, patience 
emerges as a powerful political and pedagogical virtue for continually returning to the unformed 
surplus at the heart of all reading and thinking.  Without such patience, the student might very 
well foreclose on the gap, and thus reinsert themselves back into the circulation of 
communicative capitalism.    
Lyotard’s writing takes place within communicative capitalism while simultaneously 
pushing us toward the possibility of (un)communicative communism.  It beaks asunder the 
relation between democracy’s call to equality and capitalist circulation, thus offering up a 
sublime breach of contract between politics and profit.  Whereas one privileges the agreeable, the 
good, and the beautiful within an aesthetic community, the other privileges that which 
withdraws, that which refuses to be said, that which remains in opacity.  Philosophy as a sublime 
pedagogical act returns us to the potentiality of thinking (its very preconditions) and thus forms a 
community that lacks transparency or self-identity, yet nevertheless stands in solidarity.  If we 
patiently listen, this philosophical education can return us to that which is most precious and 
precarious: the freedom to be opaque, childlike monsters. 
(Un)communicative communist pedagogy is what the Party mobilizes to interrupt the 
order of things and imbibe a sublime gap in the present order. The gap covers over the world in 
an opaque cloak that is not meant to be lifted by the all-knowing teacher or the progressive 
facilitator, but that is rather the possibility of imagining and enacting alternative social 
arrangements. There is, however, an important relationship between how the opaque is engaged, 
just as it is crucial to decipher what kind of monsters we need to be. To provide an illustration of 
the kind of aesthetic pedagogy we are after here, we want to call on the narrative of Hosea 
Hudson. Hudson was a Black sharecropper from Georgia who joined the Communist Party USA 
in 1931. Having never attended to school, Hudson got his education in the Party. As he puts it, 
“the Party learnt me a whole lot” (Painter 1994: 78). Hudson illuminates an aesthetic communist 
pedagogy that operates through the Party’s newspaper that focused on the Black nation, the 
Liberator. By 1932 Hudson was living in Birmingham, Alabama, participating in Party meetings 
on a weekly basis, meetings in which they would study and discuss the newspaper. Here is 
Hudson reflecting on the Liberator study groups his unit—which was composed of six people—
would undertake:  
We would read this paper and this would give us great courage. We had classes, reading 
these articles and the editorials in the Liberator. We’d compare, we’d talk about the right 
of self-determination. We discussed the question of if we established a government, what 
role we comrades would play, then about the relationship of the white, of the poor white, 
of the farmers, etc., in this area. If you had a government in the South—they’d give you 
the right of self-determination in the Black Belt—you got whites there. What would you 
do with the whites? We say the whites will be recognized on the basis of their percentage, 
represented on all bodies and all committees. But the Negroes at all times would be in the 
majority. All parties would be elected. We were talking about electing people to 
committees. Our position was that on committees, if you had a committee, the majority of 
that committee would be Negro. But you’d also have representatives in all committees by 
all factions, not exclusive Negro, see. (102) 
 
Here we find Hudson and the five other comrades in his unit, gathered in someone’s house, deep 
in the Jim Crow south, a racist apartheid dictatorship enforced by military and paramilitary alike. 
As Harry Haywood (1978), another Black communist, writes about his time visiting with 
Hudson in Birmingham, “racism was all-pervasive and blatant. One could feel it in the 
atmosphere. Birmingham was a mean town, a place where the police periodically shot down 
Black people” (396).  
Under the constant threat of arrest by the police or murder by the police or the Ku Klux 
Klan, they would gather to discuss this newspaper. The Liberator wasn’t an explication tool or 
device. Hudson never says that they valued it because it explained everything.  Indeed, the 
exploitation, degradation, and violence in the South could never be communicated or made fully 
transparent.  The value of the paper he highlights is the courage it communicated, the sublime 
feeling it generated that through philosophical speculation, a new freedom could be forged that 
exceeded the excesses of capitalism. The overwhelming disconnect between life as it was and 
life as it could be was not a deficiency to be overcome and explained away, but was rather a 
sublime force that allowed for philosophy to take place, a philosophy that could birth a 
communist praxis. No mere academic exercise, the point is to mobilize the opacity of the gap 
between what is and what could be pedagogically as part of a communist project for 
revolutionary transformation. The stunning chasm between the material conditions of life and the 
political program imagined wasn’t closed down, wasn’t publically articulated, and thus did not 
enter into the circuits of exchange (to become yet another liberal reformist policy). It was 
precisely this opaque chasm that animated the monstrous momentum of a radical philosophy 
beyond measure. 
This is not a call for generalized or universal opacity or a refusal of articulation and 
explication. Capital, after all, as an inherently expansive project demands surplus and excess, and 
when limits to that surplus and excess are reached, all manner of destructive crises pave the way 
for new growth. Similarly, opacity isn’t inherently antagonistic to capital. Our opacity could be 
completely irrelevant to the expansive reproduction of capitalism, or we might even conceive of 
it being commodified in some way. It is for precisely these reasons that we are constructing an 
(un)communicative communist pedagogy, an aesthetic education of, in, and for the Communist 
Party. Sublime courage wasn’t generated by the mere engagement of collectively reading 
something; it was generated by philosophizing the collective content generated by the Party from 
within the Party-form. This also means that this pedagogy isn’t proposed as a comprehensive 
platform, but rather as a kind of educational model for opening and mobilizing the possible (as 
that which confronts those who struggle against exploitation and yet nevertheless exceeds 
communication). 
Unlike Kant’s judgement of the agreeable, Hudson and his comrades were not concerned 
with mere personal preferences.  Indeed, their project was universal in scope. And unlike a 
judgment of the good, it was not based on a clear concept/blueprint of an imagined communism 
to come.  For them, the concept of the good did not merely exist in waiting but rather was a 
good-yet-to-come and thus remained to be articulated.  And unlike a judgment of the beautiful, 
the sublimity of their suffering was not foreclosed for spontaneous accord.  Rather the unbridled 
horror of capitalist racism in the South gave way to a reflection on the equally immeasurable 
power of reason to posit a communist alternative.  Thus, the patience to think through the pain of 
sublime horror alchemically transformed into a revolutionary courage: a courage forged from 
within an opaque fissure of desire for an equality that was (and is) irreducible to liberal 
democracy.  Hudson’s challenge is thus an educational challenge that still speaks to us today: 
how to foster an (un)communicative and thus militantly communist aesthetic education of 
possibilities?  
 
References 
Arendt, Hannah. 1982. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Chou, Mark. 2014. “Democrats against Democracy.” Cultural Politics, 10(2): 163-181. 
Chytry, Joseph. 1989. The Aesthetic State: A Quest in Modern German Thought. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
De Lissovoy, Noah. 2015. Education and Emancipation in the Neoliberal Era: Being, Teaching, 
and Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dean, Jodi. 2009. Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and 
Left Politics. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Dean, Jodi. 2016. Crowds and party. New York: Verso. 
Ford, Derek R. “Butler Goes to Work: A Political Economy of the Subject.” borderlands e-
journal 12(1): 1-19. 
Ford, Derek R. “Making Marxist Pedagogy Magical: From Critique to Imagination, or, How 
Bookkeepers Set Us Free.” Critical Education, 8(9): 1-13. 
Giroux, Henry. 2015. Dangerous Thinking in the Age of the New Authoritarianism. New York: 
Routledge. 
Glissant, Édouard. 1997. Poetics of Relation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Grebowicz, Margret. 2011. “Democracy and Pornography: On Speech, Rights, Privacies, and 
Pleasures in Conflict.” Hypatia 26(1): 150-165. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2005. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. 
New York: Penguin Books. 
Haywood, Harry. 1978. Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American communist. 
Chicago: Liberator Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Labaree, David F. 2010. Someone Has to Fail: The Zero-Sum Game of Public Schooling. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lewis, Tyson E. 2014. The Aesthetics of Education: Theatre, Curiosity, and Politics in the Work 
of Jacques Rancière and Paulo Freire, New York: Bloomsbury Press. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1993. The Postmodern Explained. Minneapolis and London: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1997. Postmodern Fables. Translated by George Van Den Abbeele. 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. 2013. Why Philosophize? Translated by Andrew Brown. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Painter, Nell Irvin. 1994. The Narrative of Hosea Hudson: The Life and Times of a Black 
Radical. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Schiller, Friedrich. 1982. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Steigler, Bernard and Chris Turner. 2010. “Telecracy against Democracy.” Cultural Politics, 
6(2): 171-180. 
 
                                                     
1 For a discussion of the negative impact of excluding aesthetic questions from critical pedagogy 
see Lewis (2014). 
2 For a demonstration of the relationship between the individual subject-form and capitalism, see 
Ford (2013). 
